

is supposed to be in inanimate nature. However the effect is weakened by the fact that at one moment we seem to have before us a dictum of natural philosophy which is handled cleverly by the aid of dogmatics, at another moment a dogmatic definition which rejoices in a glamorous reflection from the marvelous discoveries of natural science.

But here I abruptly terminate a disquisition which for an instant has transgressed the bounds of the present investigation. In the form in which dread existed in Adam it has never again appeared, for by him sinfulness came into the world. Consequently that dread of his has now acquired two analogous expressions: objective dread in nature, and subjective dread in the individual—of which two the latter contains a more and the former a less than that dread in Adam.

§2

Subjective dread

THE more reflective we venture to assume dread is, the easier it might seem to get it to pass over into guilt. But here it is important not to let ourselves be beguiled by gradual approximations, but to hold fast to the fact that it is not a "more" which gives rise to the leap, and that the "easier" does not in truth make the explanation easier. If we do not hold fast to this, we run the risk of stumbling suddenly upon a phenomenon where everything goes so easily that the transition becomes a simple transition, or else the risk of never daring to bring our thought to a conclusion, because the purely empirical observation can never be finished. Therefore, even though the dread become more and more reflective, the guilt which breaks forth in dread by the qualitative leap retains nevertheless the same accountability as that of Adam, and dread retains the same ambiguity.

To wish to deny that every subsequent individual has or may be assumed to have had a state of innocence analogous to that of Adam, would not only offend every man but would abrogate all rational thought, because then there would be an individual who was not an individual but was related as a sample to the species, in spite of the fact that at the same time he would be viewed under the category of the individual, that is, as a guilty man.

One may liken dread to dizziness. He whose eye chances to look down into the yawning abyss becomes dizzy. But the reason for it is just as much his eye as it is the precipice. For suppose he had not looked down.

Thus dread is the dizziness of freedom which occurs when the spirit would posit the synthesis, and freedom then gazes down into its own possibility, grasping at finiteness to sustain itself. In this dizziness freedom succumbs. Further than this psychology cannot go and will not. That very instant everything is changed, and when freedom rises again it sees that it is guilty. Between these two instants lies the leap, which no science has explained or can explain. He who becomes guilty in dread becomes as ambiguously guilty as it is possible to be. Dread is a womanish debility in which freedom swoons. Psychologically speaking, the fall into sin always occurs in impotence. But dread is at the same time the most egoistic thing, and no concrete expression of freedom is so egoistic as is the possibility of every concretion. This again is the overwhelming experience which determines the individual's ambiguous relation, both sympathetic and antipathetic. In dread there is the egoistic infinity of possibility, which does not tempt like a definite choice, but alarms (*ængster*) and fascinates with its sweet anxiety (*Be-ængstelse*).

In the later individual dread is more reflective. This may be expressed by saying that the nothing which is the object of dread becomes, as it were, more and more a something. We do not say that it really becomes something or really signifies something, we do not say that now instead of nothing there should be substituted sin or something else, for here what was true of Adam's innocence is true also of the later individual. All this applies only to freedom, and only when the individual himself by the qualitative leap posits sin. Here then the nothing of dread is a complex of presentiments which reflect themselves in themselves, coming nearer and nearer to the individual, notwithstanding that in dread they signify again essentially nothing, not, however, be it noted, a nothing with which the individual has nothing to do, but a nothing in lively communication with the ignorance of innocence. This reflectiveness is a predisposition which, before the individual becomes guilty, signifies essentially nothing, whereas when by the qualitative leap he becomes guilty it is the presupposition in which the individual goes beyond himself because sin presupposes itself, not of course before

it is posited (that would be a predestination), but presupposes itself when it is posited. ✓

We shall now consider a little more particularly that *something* which the nothing of dread may signify in the later individual. In the psychological deliberation it truly counts for something. But the psychological deliberation does not forget that if the individual were to become guilty simply by this something, then all reflection would be annulled.

This something, which signifies original sin *stricte sic dicta*, is: ✓

A. THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE FACT OF GENERATION

It is a matter of course that nothing is to be said here about subjects which might concern a physician, like the fact that a man is born with a deformity, etc., neither should there be any question of reaching a result by statistical surveys. Here as in all such cases the point is to have a right sentiment. Thus, for example, when it is affirmed that hail and a failure of the crops is due to the devil, this may be very well meant, but essentially it is a witty remark which weakens our conception of evil and introduces an almost jesting note, just as it is an aesthetic pleasantry to talk of the "dumb devil." Thus too when in the concept of faith the historical factor is stressed so one-sidedly that we forget the pristine originality of faith in the individual, it becomes a petty finiteness instead of a free infinitude. The consequence of this is that one may become accustomed to talk about faith as did Jeronymus in Heiberg's play,⁹ who says of Erasmus that he had opinions which lead astray from faith, because he affirmed that the earth is round, not flat as one generation after another in his village had believed. In that way one can stray from faith by wearing loose trousers when all the people in that village wear tight pants. When one furnishes statistical surveys of the incidence of sinfulness, with maps in color and relief which help the eye at once to make the survey, one attempts by that to deal with sin as a curious phenomenon of nature, which is not to be removed but only calculated, like the atmospheric pressure and the rainfall; and the mean or mathematical average which results is here an absurdity which has no parallel in those purely empirical sciences. It surely would be a very ludicrous abracadabra if one were to say that the mathematical average is $3\frac{3}{8}$ inches of sinfulness for each man, that in Languedoc